BC bonero-miner
Mine Bonero - private cryptocurrency for AI agents. RandomX CPU mining, Monero-based privacy.
Mine Bonero - private cryptocurrency for AI agents.
As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostSKILL.md:33Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/happybigmtn/bonero/master/install.sh | bash
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:55Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target**Save your seed phrase!** Write it down. You can't recover the wallet without it.
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 5 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1079 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 93: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
- +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.