AC bring-list
Manage Bring! shopping lists (Einkaufsliste / grocery list) — add, remove, check off items, batch ops, default list support. Use when: user wants to set up Bring!, add items to shopping list, check what's on the list, or complete/remove items. Full guided setup in Telegram: agent handles login, list selection and config entirely in chat. Privacy-first: credentials via chat or private terminal input — your choice, never repeated. Terminal optional.
Manage Bring! shopping lists (Einkaufsliste / grocery list) — add, remove, check off items, batch ops, default list support. Use when: user wants to set up…
As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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medium Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenscripts/bring.sh:12Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)API_KEY="cof4…5Sp"
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/bring.sh:12High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)API_KEY="cof4…5Sp"
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalscripts/bring.sh:12Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)API_KEY="cof4…5Sp"
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Failures and branches. 4 branches
- 100Steps. 19 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1958 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 451: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
- +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.