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BC browser-secure

Secure browser automation with Chrome profile support, vault integration, approval gates, and comprehensive audit logging. Use for authenticated sites, sensitive operations, or compliance requirements.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 20 files body ≈ 3 798 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Secure browser automation with Chrome profile support, vault integration, approval gates, and comprehensive audit logging.

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationGmailPlaywrightAI and agentsSecuritySoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
87
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 9

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 9
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:70
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…uWm+fFRcIOgKBMiOBP+eXiy…9ab+DDKA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:128
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…wQp+7C4n…9JQ==",
      detector
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:27
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openclaw/openclaw/main/scripts/install-browser-secure.sh | bash
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:172
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openclaw/openclaw/main/scripts/install-browser-secure.sh | bash
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:211
      Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)
      cp .env.example .env
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:272
      Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)
      cp .env.example .env
      security skill
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/vault/discovery.ts:243
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      const opResult = await inte…ery(domain);
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/vault/discovery.ts:348
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      async function inte…ery(

    Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 41 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3798 tokens
    • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (9 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -229 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 201: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 36 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 41 items
    • +4Has examples (25 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.