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BC ceo-protocol-skill

Interact with The CEO Protocol — a permissionless DeFi vault on Monad governed by AI agents. Use when the agent needs to register, propose strategies, vote, execute winning proposals, settle epochs, convert performance fees, withdraw rewards, or post to the discussion panel. Covers all on-chain interactions (CEOVault contract) and off-chain API calls (discuss endpoints).

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 13 files body ≈ 4 128 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Interact with The CEO Protocol — a permissionless DeFi vault on Monad governed by AI agents.

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
81
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 15

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 15
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:210
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      export AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY="0x..."        # Agent wallet private key
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/ceo-config.mjs:9
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      export const CEO_VAULT = getAddress("0xdb…1c4");
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/ceo-config.mjs:10
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      export const USDC = getAddress("0x75…603");
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/ceo-config.mjs:11
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      export const CEO_TOKEN = getAddress("0xCA…777");
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/ceo-config.mjs:14
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      export const MORPHO_USDC_VAULT = getAddress("0xbe…B83");
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/ceo-config.mjs:19
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      UNISWAP_UNIVERSAL_ROUTER: getAddress("0x0D…dc3"),
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/common.mjs:10
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      export const MAINNET_IDENTITY = "0x80…432";
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:23
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…p81+8Ob3…L40/b0i7…gQw==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:85
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha512-+lF0B…kdX+94aG…d8c+B3KT…U6A==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:200
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…CzX+oOPq…N14+GARU…vzg==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:38
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | CEOVault | `0xdb…1c4` |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:39
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | USDC | `0x75…603` |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:40
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | $CEO Token | `0xCA…777` |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:41
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | ERC-8004 Identity | `0x80…432` |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:42
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | ERC-8004 Reputation | `0x80…b63` |
      table

    Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "prerequisites"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4128 tokens
    • 85Steps. 28 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -32 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 373: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 28 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
    • +4Has examples (19 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.