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FD Claude-Mem OpenClaw Plugin — Setup Guide

This guide walks through setting up the claude-mem plugin on an OpenClaw gateway. By the end, your agents will have persistent memory across sessions, a live-updating MEMORY.md in their workspace, ...

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 12 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 3 911 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

This guide walks through setting up the claude-mem plugin on an OpenClaw gateway.

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationSlackDiscordTelegramWhatsAppAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
26/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 19

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:17
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://install.cmem.ai/openclaw.sh | bash
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:27
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://install.cmem.ai/openclaw.sh | bash -s -- --provider=gemini --api-key=YOUR_KEY
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:33
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://install.cmem.ai/openclaw.sh | bash -s -- --non-interactive
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:39
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://install.cmem.ai/openclaw.sh | bash -s -- --upgrade
Medium and low: 15
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:8
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    #   curl -fsSL https://install.cmem.ai/openclaw.sh | bash
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:10
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    #   curl -fsSL https://install.cmem.ai/openclaw.sh | bash -s -- --provider=gemini --api-key=YOUR_KEY
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:84
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    # stdin is piped (curl | bash) but /dev/tty is available
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host install.sh:522
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    if ! curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash; then
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:1599
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "  bash <(curl -fsSL https://install.cmem.ai/openclaw.sh)"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:65
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use src/index.ts:359
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    const response = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${botToken}/sendMessage`, {
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:72
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition; code comment)
    # TTY detection — ensure interactive prompts work under curl | bash
    detectorcomment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host install.sh:525
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
    error "  curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash"
    code literal
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url src/index.ts:359
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    const response = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${botToken}/sendMessage`, {
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell test-install.sh:1678
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment; test fixture / example file)
    # Test: Script structure — curl | bash usage comment
    commentfixture
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell test-install.sh:1682
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file)
    echo "=== curl | bash usage comment ==="
    detectorcode literalfixture
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell test-install.sh:1684
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file)
    if grep -q 'curl -fsSL.*raw.githubusercontent.com.*install.sh | bash' "$INSTALL_SCRIPT"; then
    detectorcode literalfixture
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell test-install.sh:1685
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file)
    test_pass "install.sh contains curl | bash usage comment"
    code literalfixture
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell test-install.sh:1687
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file)
    test_fail "install.sh should contain curl | bash usage comment"
    code literalfixture

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Claude-Mem OpenClaw Plugin — Setup Guide) differs from the folder (claude-mem)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 85Steps. 27 steps, 3 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3911 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 200: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 34 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
  • +4Has examples (29 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.