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Back up OpenClaw customizations (memory, config, skills, workspace) to cloud storage via rclone, with scheduling + retention. Works on macOS, Linux, and Windows (Git Bash/WSL).

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 895 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Back up OpenClaw customizations (memory, config, skills, workspace) to cloud storage via rclone, with scheduling + retention.

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureGitHubSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
64/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
59
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence install-launchagent.sh:100
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    if ! launchctl load "$AGENT_PLIST"; then
Medium and low: 7
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege install-launchagent.sh:86
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -f "$DAEMON_PLIST"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:80
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **macOS:** `launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.backup.plist`
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:97
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **macOS:** The setup generates a LaunchAgent plist. Install with the printed commands (copy to `~/Library/LaunchAgents/` and `launchctl load` — no sudo for the agent). Or run the universal installer
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence setup.js:387
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    console.log(`  launchctl load "${path.join(launchAgentsDir, "com.openclaw.backup.plist")}"`);
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:81
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Linux:** remove the backup line from `crontab -e`
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:98
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Linux:** Add the printed cron line to `crontab -e`.
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention setup.js:389
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (string literal in code, not executed)
    console.log(`\nAdd this line to crontab (crontab -e):`);
    code literal

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, git, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 23 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 895 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 176: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.