SKILLEMALL.ai

AA clawpost

Posts tweets to X (Twitter) via Claw Post API. Use when the user wants to post to X, publish a tweet, or share content on X/Twitter.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 1 file body ≈ 602 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Posts tweets to X (Twitter) via Claw Post API.

As a process A 80/100 · Runs to the end — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice

IntegrationData and analyticsSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
A
80/100
Runs to the end
Result and completion w 14
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Inputs and preconditions w 11
70
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token SKILL.md:45
      Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
      Header: clawpost-api-key: claw…2d3
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:45
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      Header: clawpost-api-key: claw…2d3

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 80/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 11 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 602 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 132: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.