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CF crypto-sniper-oracle

Institutional-grade quantitative market oracle with Order Book Imbalance (OBI), VWAP analysis, automated reports, and Telegram alerts.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 5 files body ≈ 3 015 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Institutional-grade quantitative market oracle with Order Book Imbalance (OBI), VWAP analysis, automated reports, and Telegram alerts.

As a process F 35/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: LICENSE

AnalyzerTelegramData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
68/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
71
Quality 40%
64
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
35/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: LICENSE
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 17

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 17
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc CONFIGURATION.md:73
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN="1234…xyz"' >> ~/.bashrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc CONFIGURATION.md:74
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID="123456789"' >> ~/.bashrc
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:366
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host)
    POST https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendMessage
    vendor-host
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url CONFIGURATION.md:47
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    https://api.telegram.org/botYOUR_TOKEN/getUpdates
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention CONFIGURATION.md:107
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention CONFIGURATION.md:149
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -l
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url CONFIGURATION.md:299
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    curl https://api.telegram.org/bot$TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN/getMe
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use CONFIGURATION.md:299
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl https://api.telegram.org/bot$TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN/getMe
    vendor-host
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention CONFIGURATION.md:332
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -l
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.md:223
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    2. Visit: `https://api.telegram.org/bot{YOUR_TOKEN}/getUpdates`
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:249
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:268
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -l
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url reporter.py:267
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    self.api_url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage"
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:15
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - "https://api.telegram.org/bot*"
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:240
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - ✅ `https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/*` (send messages only)
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:438
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    2. Visit: https://api.telegram.org/bot{YOUR_TOKEN}/getUpdates
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:461
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: LICENSE

Process rating: all ten parameters 35/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: LICENSE
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: LICENSE
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Steps. 61 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3015 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -231 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 134: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 39 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 61 items
  • +4Has examples (24 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.