SKILLEMALL.ai

BB deepread-agent-setup

Authenticate AI agents with the DeepRead OCR API using OAuth device flow. The agent displays a code, the user approves it in their browser, and the agent receives a DEEPREAD_API_KEY stored as an environment variable.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Claude Code author: modbender MIT 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 949 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Authenticate AI agents with the DeepRead OCR API using OAuth device flow.

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers

IntegrationAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc device_flow.sh:77
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "  Option 2: Manually add 'export DEEPREAD_API_KEY=\"...\"' to ~/.zshrc"

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "title"

Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1949 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 216: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.