SKILLEMALL.ai

BC Epstein Emails API

Query 383,000+ court-released Epstein emails via a pay-per-request API. Structured JSON. USDC on Base via the x402 protocol.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 1 file body ≈ 2 220 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Query 383,000+ court-released Epstein emails via a pay-per-request API.

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

IntegrationSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:17
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `XCLA…KEY` | `0x` + 64 hex chars | Yes | EVM wallet private key for signing payments |
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:245
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      | Token | USDC (0x83…913) |
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:248
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      | Recipient | 0xF9…1Ea |

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Epstein Emails API) differs from the folder (epstein-emails)
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 17 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2220 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 124: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.