SKILLEMALL.ai

BD frigatebird

Use the frigatebird npm package to interact with X from the CLI with bird-style command parity, posting/reply/article support, and list automation without X API keys.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
modbender/skill-library-mcp Claude Code author: modbender MIT 1 file body ≈ 657 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Use the frigatebird npm package to interact with X from the CLI with bird-style command parity, posting/reply/article support, and list automation without X…

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationPlaywrightWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:53
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    - Auth/cookies: `--auth-token`, `--ct0`, `--cookie-source`, `--chrome-profile`, `--firefox-profile`

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 39 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 657 tokens
  • low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 166: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.