DD github-passwordless-setup
Complete GitHub passwordless authentication setup using SSH keys and Personal Access Tokens. Never type passwords or re-authenticate for Git operations and GitHub API calls.
Complete GitHub passwordless authentication setup using SSH keys and Personal Access Tokens.
As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 9
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high Exfiltration
exfil-read-secret-filesSKILL.md:388Reads credential / secret filescat ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml
Medium and low: 8
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostREADME.md:21Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/happydog-intj/github-passwordless-setup/master/setup.sh | bash
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostREADME.zh-CN.md:21Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/happydog-intj/github-passwordless-setup/master/setup.sh | bash
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostSKILL.md:34Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/happydog-intj/github-passwordless-setup/master/setup.sh | bash
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:138Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionscurl -fsSL https://cli.github.com/packages/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg | sudo dd of=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:139Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo chmod go+r /usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:140Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionsecho "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg] https://cli.github.com/packages stable main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/github-cli.lis
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low Secrets in code
secret-github-tokensetup.sh:141GitHub token (placeholder value)echo "Token format: ghp_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
placeholder -
low Secrets in code
secret-github-tokenSKILL.md:126GitHub token (placeholder value)Format: `ghp_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx`
placeholder
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 12 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 42 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3352 tokens
- low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -231 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 173: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 44 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
- +4Has examples (33 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.