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CD grok-twitter-search

使用 xAI Grok 模型的 x_search 工具智能搜索 Twitter 内容。首创 Fast/Reasoning 双引擎动态路由，支持 SOCKS5 代理（WARP）精准流量分流。相比官方 X API 成本呈断崖式下降（实测约 $2.8/千次），语义理解更强、结果更智能。当用户需要搜索推特、监控舆情、分析热点话题、获取实时推文数据时使用此技能。

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 14 files · 5 scripts body ≈ 816 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 3 d ago

使用 xAI Grok 模型的 xsearch 工具智能搜索 Twitter 内容。首创 Fast/Reasoning 双引擎动态路由，支持 SOCKS5 代理（WARP）精准流量分流。相比官方 X API 成本呈断崖式下降（实测约…

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
68/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/CONFIG.md:73
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/cloudflare-client.list
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/configure_api_key.sh:25
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "2. 写入 ~/.bashrc (当前用户全局生效)"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/configure_api_key.sh:68
    Writes to a shell startup file
    cat >> ~/.bashrc << EOF
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/configure_api_key.sh:77
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "✅ 配置已写入 ~/.bashrc (已备份原文件)"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/configure_api_key.sh:78
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "👉 请执行 source ~/.bashrc 立即生效。"
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/CONFIG.md:80
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable warp-svc
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/setup_interactive.py:35
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
    print("   安装命令: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh")
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/setup_interactive.py:328
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    print("     sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/cloudflare-client.list")
    code literal

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 16 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 816 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -212 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -35 of 8 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 177: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.