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BC guardskills

Security gate for skill installs. Scans skill content for malicious patterns (credential exfiltration, remote code execution, destructive ops, privilege escalation) before installation. Always run guardskills before installing any skill from ClawHub, GitHub, or local sources.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 1 file body ≈ 874 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Security gate for skill installs.

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    description: Security gate for skill installs. Scans skill content for malicious patterns (credential exfiltration, remote code execution, destructive ops, privilege escalation) before installation. A
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:133
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - The scanner checks for: credential exfiltration, remote code execution chains, destructive filesystem operations, privilege escalation, obfuscated payloads, and suspicious network activity.

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Failures and branches. 6 branches
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 874 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 276: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.