CD jellyseerr
Request movies and TV shows through Jellyseerr. Use when the user wants to add media to their Plex/Jellyfin server, search for content availability, or manage media requests.
Request movies and TV shows through Jellyseerr.
As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.
Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 12
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistenceSKILL.md:78Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)crontab /tmp/cron_backup.txt
Medium and low: 11
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medium Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobreferences/WEBHOOK_SETUP.md:46Long base64-looking blobeyJu…G1k
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/WEBHOOK_SETUP.md:165Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo rm /etc/systemd/system/jellyseerr-webhook.service
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencereferences/WEBHOOK_SETUP.md:175Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)crontab -l | grep -v jellyseerr | crontab -
detector -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegescripts/setup_webhook.sh:11Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo tee /etc/systemd/system/${SERVICE_NAME}.service > /dev/null << EOF -
medium Exfiltration
net-credential-usescripts/setup.sh:18Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -H "X-Api-Key: $API_KEY" "$SERVER_URL/api/v1/status" 2>/dev/null) -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-cron-mentionreferences/WEBHOOK_SETUP.md:175Mentions editing / listing crontabcrontab -l | grep -v jellyseerr | crontab -
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegescripts/install_service.sh:3Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (code comment)# Run this with: sudo bash install_service.sh
comment -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processscripts/install_service.sh:35Starts a background / autostarted processsystemctl enable ${SERVICE_NAME} -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processscripts/setup_webhook.sh:30Starts a background / autostarted processsudo systemctl enable ${SERVICE_NAME} -
low Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobscripts/setup_webhook.sh:42Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)echo 'eyJu…kaW
quoted -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-cron-mentionSKILL.md:76Mentions editing / listing crontabcrontab -l > /tmp/cron_backup.txt
Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Steps. 2 steps
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 461 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3No numbered steps or checklist
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -34 of 11 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 174: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 9 headings
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.