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BC kiln

Control 3D printers with AI agents — 273 MCP tools, 107 CLI commands, text/sketch-to-3D generation, model marketplace search, multi-printer fleet support, safety enforcement, and outsourced manufacturing

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 17 files body ≈ 7 311 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Control 3D printers with AI agents — 273 MCP tools, 107 CLI commands, text/sketch-to-3D generation, model marketplace search, multi-printer fleet support…

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentsSoftware developmentCommercetype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
64
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security COMPLETED_TASKS.md:46
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Auth disabled-mode safety** — `verify()` returns `scopes={"read","write"}` (not `{"admin"}`) when auth disabled. Prevents accidental privilege escalation.
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob COMPLETED_TASKS.md:162
    Long base64-looking blob (detector / deny-list definition)
    - Solana devnet tx: `3BDZ…EsN`.
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host COMPLETED_TASKS.md:341
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    7. **Install script** — `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/codeofaxel/Kiln/main/install.sh | sh` — detects OS, installs pipx, clones, installs, verifies
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security TASKS.md:221
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - ~~**Auth disabled-mode safety**~~ ✅ Done (2026-02-19). When `KILN_AUTH_ENABLED=0`, `verify()` now returns `scopes={"read","write"}` instead of `{"admin"}`. Prevents accidental privilege escalation.

Files scanned: 17. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7311 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7311 tokens
  • 100Steps. 25 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 203: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 46 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (37 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.