BC k8s-manifest-generator
Create production-ready Kubernetes manifests for Deployments, Services, ConfigMaps, and Secrets following best practices and security standards. Use when generating Kubernetes YAML manifests, creating K8s resources, or implementing production-grade Kubernetes configurations.
Create production-ready Kubernetes manifests for Deployments, Services, ConfigMaps, and Secrets following best practices and security standards.
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
The same skill appears in 1 more place: skill-library-mcp
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
-
high Secrets in code
secret-private-keySKILL.md:223Private key material (key header without key body)-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header only
Medium and low: 2
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/deployment-spec.md:504Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)- Disable privilege escalation
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:309Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [ ] Disable privilege escalation
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 29 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 85Steps. 108 steps, 2 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3203 tokens
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 275: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 25 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 108 items
- +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.