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BD launchagent-manager

List, classify, prune LaunchAgents; analyze openclaw.json so the proper gateway LaunchAgent remains connected and tokens match. Keeps only OpenClaw-related agents; can unload/delete others.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 3 files body ≈ 828 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

List, classify, prune LaunchAgents; analyze openclaw.json so the proper gateway LaunchAgent remains connected and tokens match. Keeps only OpenClaw-related…

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/launchagent_manager.py:207
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    report["recommendations"].append("Load gateway LaunchAgent: launchctl load " + gateway_agent["path"])
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/launchagent_manager.py:217
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    report["recommendations"].append("Load gateway: launchctl load " + gateway_agent["path"])
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:38
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - **--config --fix** — If gateway plist not loaded: run `launchctl load <plist>`. If tokens don't match: run gateway-guard `ensure --apply --json`. Requires gateway-guard skill.
    detector
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:49
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Only user domain is touched: `~/Library/LaunchAgents/`. System domain is not modified.
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:51
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - With --delete-plists, backups are written to `OPENCLAW_HOME/backups/launchagents/` before deletion.
    detector

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 85Steps. 20 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 828 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 189: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.