BD limitless_lifelogs
Search, summarize, and extract insights from your Limitless AI pendant life logs. Supports keyword and semantic search, date range queries, memory recall, and action item extraction for named agents.
Search, summarize, and extract insights from your Limitless AI pendant life logs.
As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcinstall.sh:30Writes to a shell startup fileecho " # Add to ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc to persist it."
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medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:38Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -s -H "X-API-Key: $LIMITLESS_API_KEY" \
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medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:59Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -s -H "X-API-Key: $LIMITLESS_API_KEY" \
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
name-formatname should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens) - warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (limitless_lifelogs) differs from the folder (limitless-lifelogs)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 85Steps. 26 steps, 2 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1713 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 199: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 13 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.