BC mediator
Intercept and filter communications from difficult contacts. Strips emotion, extracts facts, drafts neutral responses. Use when setting up communication filtering for specific contacts, configuring the mediator, or processing intercepted messages. Triggers on "mediator", "intercept messages", "filter communications", "difficult contact", or requests to handle messages from someone the user doesn't want to deal with directly.
Intercept and filter communications from difficult contacts.
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-eval-dynamicscripts/config-helper.py:13Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted inputos.system(f"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml") -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-eval-dynamicscripts/process-email.py:17Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted inputos.system(f"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml") -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-eval-dynamicscripts/process-imessage.py:17Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted inputos.system(f"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml")
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Steps. 29 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1067 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 428: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.