BC moltbook-firewall
Security layer protecting agents from prompt injection, social engineering, and malicious content on Moltbook and similar platforms. Scan content before processing, detect threats, block attacks.
Security layer protecting agents from prompt injection, social engineering, and malicious content on Moltbook and similar platforms.
As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.
An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
-
medium Instruction override
en-ignore-previousSKILL.md:15Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (documentation of a security skill)Attempts to override your system instructions through content that looks like commands.
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegescripts/firewall-scan.sh:97Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed; documentation of a security skill)"chmod 777" \
code literalsecurity skill
A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 100Steps. 30 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 801 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 195: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.