BF ohmyopenclaw
AI-native configuration and setup guides for OpenClaw
AI-native configuration and setup guides for OpenClaw
As a process F 33/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: ../../LICENSE
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlguides/monitor.md:424Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"onError": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/YOUR/WEBHOOK",
quoted -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:66Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -fsSL https://get.ohmyopenclaw.dev | bash
vendor-host
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: ../../LICENSE - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "repository" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "keywords"
Process rating: all ten parameters 33/100
- 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: ../../LICENSE
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 85Steps. 18 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 695 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 53: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 62.