CC onemind
Access and participate in collective consensus-building chats on OneMind. Submit propositions, rate on a 0-100 grid, and reach consensus with humans and other agents.
Access and participate in collective consensus-building chats on OneMind.
As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.
Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 16
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 16
-
medium Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobSKILL.md:36Long base64-looking blobeyJh…uN-
-
medium Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobSKILL.md:64Long base64-looking blobapikey: eyJh…0fb
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenSKILL.md:64Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)apikey: eyJh…0fb
-
low Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobSKILL.md:43Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…fB5
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenSKILL.md:43Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…fB5
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:43Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…fB5
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:64Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)apikey: eyJh…0fb
-
low Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobSKILL.md:76Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…fB5
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenSKILL.md:76Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…fB5
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:76Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…fB5
quoted -
low Obfuscation
obf-base64-blobSKILL.md:86Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…fB5
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenSKILL.md:86Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…fB5
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:86Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…fB5
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenSKILL.md:101Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…fB5
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:101Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)-H "apikey: eyJh…fB5
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:263High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)- **Token Mint:** `mnte…Tr3` (Solana SPL)
detector
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 15 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2219 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 166: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.