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BD openclaw-marshal

Define security policies for your workspace and audit compliance. Check installed skills against command, network, and data handling rules. Generate audit-ready compliance reports.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 3 files body ≈ 981 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Define security policies for your workspace and audit compliance.

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSecurityData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/marshal.py:119
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    "block": ["curl|bash", "wget -O-|sh", "rm -rf /", "chmod 777"],
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/marshal.py:119
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    "block": ["curl|bash", "wget -O-|sh", "rm -rf /", "chmod 777"],
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/marshal.py:153
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    "block": ["curl|bash", "wget -O-|sh", "rm -rf /", "chmod 777"],
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/marshal.py:153
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    "block": ["curl|bash", "wget -O-|sh", "rm -rf /", "chmod 777"],
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/marshal.py:182
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    "curl|bash", "wget -O-|sh", "rm -rf /", "chmod 777",
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/marshal.py:182
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    "curl|bash", "wget -O-|sh", "rm -rf /", "chmod 777",
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/marshal.py:215
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    "block": ["curl|bash", "wget -O-|sh", "rm -rf /", "chmod 777"],
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/marshal.py:215
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    "block": ["curl|bash", "wget -O-|sh", "rm -rf /", "chmod 777"],
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/marshal.py:1468
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "chmod 777", "eval(", "pickle.load",
    quoted

A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 17 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 981 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 180: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.