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BC openclaw-optimizer

Use when: you want to optimize an OpenClaw setup (v2026.2.23+) — cost reduction, model routing, provider configuration, context management, cron automation, sub-agent architecture, skills, or agent personality/identity optimization (SOUL.md, IDENTITY.md, AGENTS.md, USER.md audit). Also use when troubleshooting any OpenClaw error, startup failure, channel issue, or provider problem. CLI-first. Advisory by default — audit first, propose exact changes, apply only on approval. Output: prioritized plan + exact CLI commands + config patches + rollback.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 12 files · 1 script body ≈ 14 298 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

2.23+) — cost reduction, model routing, provider configuration, context management, cron automation, sub-agent architecture, skills, or agent…

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, execution cost

IntegrationGitHubAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
87
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Execution cost w 6
40
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:575
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist  # re-register + start clean
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:730
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    /usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Delete :EnvironmentVariables:<KEY>' ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:646
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | "Port already in use" loop | `ps aux \| grep openclaw-gateway` | Duplicate processes from CLI restart vs LaunchAgent `KeepAlive`. Fix: `launchctl bootout` → kill orphans → `launchctl bootstrap` (see
    tablesecurity skill

A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 14298 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 14298 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Steps. 156 steps, 5 vague phrases
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (32 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 552: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 46 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 156 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (28 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.