BC openclaw-snitch
Multi-layer blocklist guard for OpenClaw. Hard-blocks tool calls matching banned patterns, injects a security directive at agent bootstrap, warns on incoming messages, and broadcasts Telegram alerts. Blocks clawhub/clawdhub by default.
Multi-layer blocklist guard for OpenClaw.
As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:223High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…yQ4+1JEU…qkW+cY7W…Kyb+GUaGyKUA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:383High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…ty7+DBqs…prZ+x1SpF3ZuQ==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:425High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…JUZ+3xNo…85o+H9ft…CVw==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:439High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…jif+Vm6r…Mb9+Km3i…Pxg==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:522High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…GD3+82K6JgJlm/Y+KI92…no5+4jh9sw==",
detector
Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 6 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 674 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 235: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 8 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 6 items
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.