SKILLEMALL.ai

BC openclaw-x

Control your X/Twitter account — view timeline, search tweets, post, like, retweet, bookmark.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 1 file body ≈ 542 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Control your X/Twitter account — view timeline, search tweets, post, like, retweet, bookmark.

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
76/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:14
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    2. Export your X cookies from Chrome (using Cookie-Editor extension), save as `cookies.json` in the same directory

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 85Steps. 12 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 542 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 93: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.