BC ops-framework
A 0-token jobs + monitoring framework for OpenClaw: run long-running read tasks via scripts, checkpoint/resume safely, and send periodic progress + immediate alerts to Telegram. Write jobs are blocked by default and must be explicitly approved and verified.
A 0-token jobs + monitoring framework for OpenClaw: run long-running read tasks via scripts, checkpoint/resume safely, and send periodic progress + immediate…
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-persistenceOPS_FRAMEWORK.md:108Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- （可选）调度器（macOS launchd）：`~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.ops-monitor.plist`
quoted -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlops-monitor.py:191Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendMessage"vendor-hostquoted
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 32 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 819 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 257: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 7 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.