CC otp-challenger
Enable agents and skills to challenge users for fresh two-factor authentication proof (TOTP or YubiKey) before executing sensitive actions. Use this for identity verification in approval workflows - deploy commands, financial operations, data access, admin operations, and change control.
Enable agents and skills to challenge users for fresh two-factor authentication proof (TOTP or YubiKey) before executing sensitive actions.
As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 8
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-destructive-fsINSTALLATION.md:280Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (detector / deny-list definition)./verify.sh "testuser" "'; rm -rf /*; echo '" # Should reject code injection
detector
Medium and low: 7
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medium Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenconfig-template.yaml:50Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)# secretKey: "dGhp…2V5"
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcINSTALLATION.md:145Writes to a shell startup fileecho "source ~/.openclaw-otp-config.sh" >> ~/.bashrc
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medium Broad scope
meta-agent-memory-dumpmemory/README.mdAgent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokensmemory/README.md
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low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenconfig-template.yaml:33Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (placeholder value)secretKey: "YOUR…ERE"
placeholder -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalconfig-template.yaml:50Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)# secretKey: "dGhp…2V5"
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low Secrets in code
secret-password-literaldocs/plans/2025-01-31-yubikey-support-design.md:38Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)secretKey: "base…ing=" # new
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low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalSKILL.md:115Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)secretKey: "base…ret"
Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 24 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 755 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 288: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 11 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.