BB paradiz
Отвечать клиентам в VK по стоимости отдыха на основе Excel-прайса. Использовать, когда нужно быстро посчитать цену по датам, количеству гостей и номеру, и выдать короткий продающий ответ для соцсети.
Отвечать клиентам в VK по стоимости отдыха на основе Excel-прайса.
As a process B 73/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlscripts/save_booking.py:13Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage"quoted -
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlscripts/save_booking.py:180Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (detector / deny-list definition)if bt.startswith('https://api.telegram.org/bot'):detector -
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlscripts/save_booking.py:181Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (detector / deny-list definition)bt = bt.replace('https://api.telegram.org/bot', '', 1)detector
Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 73/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Failures and branches. 14 branches
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4913 tokens
- 85Steps. 124 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -219 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- -32 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +3Description length 199: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 28 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 124 items
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
- +2Bilingual instructions (RU + EN)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.