DD PPT Generator Pro - Claude Code Skill
或直接告诉 Claude:
或直接告诉 Claude:
As a process D 39/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 21
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 21
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medium Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenAPI_MANAGEMENT.md:73Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)api_key = "AIza…GpM"
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medium Secrets in code
secret-google-keyAPI_MANAGEMENT.md:73Google API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)api_key = "AIza…GpM"
quoted -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcAPI_MANAGEMENT.md:305Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export GEMINI_API_KEY="..."' >> ~/.zshrc
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcENV_SETUP.md:105Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export GEMINI_API_KEY="your-api-key"' >> ~/.zshrc
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcENV_SETUP.md:111Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export GEMINI_API_KEY="your-api-key"' >> ~/.bashrc
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcREADME.md:206Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export GEMINI_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"' >> ~/.zshrc
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcREADME.md:210Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export GEMINI_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"' >> ~/.bashrc
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcrun.sh:27Writes to a shell startup fileecho " echo 'export GEMINI_API_KEY=\"your-key\"' >> ~/.zshrc"
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcrun.sh:28Writes to a shell startup fileecho " source ~/.zshrc"
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenAPI_MANAGEMENT.md:73High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)api_key = "AIza…GpM"
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalAPI_MANAGEMENT.md:73Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)api_key = "AIza…GpM"
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvAPI_MANAGEMENT.md:128Reads a .env filecp .env.development .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvAPI_MANAGEMENT.md:302Reads a .env filecat .env | grep GEMINI_API_KEY
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvAPI_MANAGEMENT.md:336Reads a .env filecat .env | grep GEMINI_API_KEY
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvREADME.md:110Reads a .env filecp .env.example .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvREADME.md:185Reads a .env filecp .env.example .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvREADME.md:250Reads a .env filecp .env.example .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvREADME.md:299Reads a .env filecp .env.example .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvREADME.md:742Reads a .env filecp .env.example .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvrun.sh:31Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)echo " cp .env.example .env"
quoted -
low Exfiltration
read-dotenvSECURITY.md:175Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)cp .env.example .env
security skill
Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
name-formatname should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens) - warning
description-shortdescription under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering - warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 39/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (PPT Generator Pro - Claude Code Skill) differs from the folder (ppt-generator-pro)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 137 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2629 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 13: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -237 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 57 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 137 items
- +4Has examples (34 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 54.