CD project-cerebro
Project Cerebro - Control Surface: modular multi-brain execution dashboard built on OpenClaw
Project Cerebro - Control Surface: modular multi-brain execution dashboard built on OpenClaw
As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 14
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 14
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeREADME.md:121Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo cp project-cerebro.service /etc/systemd/system/
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenfrontend/package-lock.json:322High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…SzS+cfgl…B0A==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenfrontend/package-lock.json:336High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha512-GZMB+a0mO…4cw+w1WV…UED+1X8a…sJi+8mgpw==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenfrontend/package-lock.json:506High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…HK5+NE/tvnRLbIqUWa+0E9N4WNMjmp/kXXP…R8w==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenfrontend/package-lock.json:727High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…78O/B3Kkh+nKABUF++bvJv…56W+C8F9…X6m+IktJnIb1Jjg==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenfrontend/package-lock.json:935High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…yQ4+1JEU…qkW+cY7W…Kyb+GUaGyKUA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:65High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…4wC+Keca…vc6/fddvw/6lg9…Dt9+DkIvjXImQQ==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:74High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…7KL+OVwF…Elx+TiI1/6kcmcEe+g5YR…OvQ==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:112High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…p7K+vRNE…9hg==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:162High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…p7K+vRNE…9hg==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:269High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"integrity": "sha5…Z8c+xF4WafPK+XzneQDPU+D10r…jX2+qtFF…YgQ==",
quoted -
low Exfiltration
read-dotenvREADME.md:42Reads a .env filecp .env.example .env
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processREADME.md:123Starts a background / autostarted processsudo systemctl enable project-cerebro
-
low Exfiltration
read-dotenvSETUP.md:28Reads a .env filecp .env.example .env
Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 85Steps. 28 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 690 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 92: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 8 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.