SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC reddit-spy

Stealth Reddit intelligence -- browse, read, and analyze any subreddit without getting blocked. Multi-layer fallback (OAuth API -> Stealth HTTP -> Browser Stealth -> PullPush archive).

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 15 files body ≈ 1 447 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Stealth Reddit intelligence -- browse, read, and analyze any subreddit without getting blocked.

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSoftware developmentData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/lib/browser_stealth.py:60
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    browser = p.chromium.launch(headless=True, args=["--no-sandbox", "--disable-setuid-sandbox"])
    detectorcode literal

Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1447 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 184: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
  • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.