BC security-scanner
Scans OpenClaw skills for security vulnerabilities and suspicious patterns before installation
Scans OpenClaw skills for security vulnerabilities and suspicious patterns before installation
As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, consistency
AnalyzerGitHubSoftware developmentAI and agentsSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityCONTRIBUTING.md:197Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)KEYLOGGER: { -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityCONTRIBUTING.md:204Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)description: 'Possible keylogger - captures keyboard input',
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityREADME.md:99Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)2. [🔴 CRITICAL] Potential credential harvesting detected
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityREADME.md:131Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Credential harvesting patterns
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:108Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Credential harvesting patterns
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:116Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Privilege escalation attempts
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (security-scanner) differs from the folder (security-skill-scanner)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 77 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2444 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 94: 120–800 characters recommended
- -224 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 32 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 77 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.