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CC agentguard

GoPlus AgentGuard — AI agent security guard. Automatically blocks dangerous commands, prevents data leaks, and protects secrets. Use when reviewing third-party code, auditing skills, checking for vulnerabilities, evaluating action safety, or viewing security logs.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
modbender/skill-library-mcp Claude Code author: modbender MIT 12 files body ≈ 3 946 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

GoPlus AgentGuard — AI agent security guard.

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
66/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
56
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 19

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs SKILL.md:317
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (documentation of a security skill)
    | 2025-01-15 14:30 | Bash | rm -rf / | DENY | critical | DANGEROUS_COMMAND | some-skill |
    security skill
Medium and low: 18
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs action-policies.md:65
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `> /dev/sda` | Disk overwrite |
    tablesecurity skill
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scan-rules.md:115
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    | Quoted string with 12-24 BIP-39 words starting with: abandon, ability, able, about, above, absent, absorb, abstract, absurd, abuse | Mnemonic phrase |
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell action-policies.md:67
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `wget\|sh` / `curl\|sh` | Download and execute |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell action-policies.md:68
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `wget\|bash` / `curl\|bash` | Download and execute |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files action-policies.md:75
    Reads credential / secret files (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `cat /etc/shadow` | Password hashes |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files action-policies.md:79
    Reads credential / secret files (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `cat ~/.npmrc` | npm auth tokens |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files action-policies.md:80
    Reads credential / secret files (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `cat ~/.netrc` | Network credentials |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scan-rules.md:48
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input (documentation of a security skill)
    | `exec\s*\(\s*requests\.get` | Python exec(requests.get()) |
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scan-rules.md:49
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input (documentation of a security skill)
    | `eval\s*\(\s*requests\.get` | Python eval(requests.get()) |
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scan-rules.md:50
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input (documentation of a security skill)
    | `exec\s*\(\s*urllib` | Python exec(urllib) |
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scan-rules.md:51
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input (documentation of a security skill)
    | `eval\s*\(\s*urllib` | Python eval(urllib) |
    security skill
  • low Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scan-rules.md:93
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `Chrome.*Cookies` (i) | Chrome cookies |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scan-rules.md:116
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)
    | `seed[_\s]?phrase\s*[:=]\s*['"\x60]` (i) | Seed phrase assignment |
    detectortable
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scan-rules.md:118
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)
    | `recovery[_\s]?phrase\s*[:=]\s*['"\x60]` (i) | Recovery phrase assignment |
    detectortable

A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (agentguard) differs from the folder (security)
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3946 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low The response is described with custom markup (27 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 264: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.