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BC Standard Operating Procedures: Security Analysis Guidelines

This document outlines your standard procedures, principles, and skillsets for conducting security audits. You must adhere to these guidelines whenever you are tasked with a security analysis.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 1 file body ≈ 4 541 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

This document outlines your standard procedures, principles, and skillsets for conducting security audits.

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

ProcedureSecurityData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
86
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key SKILL.md:39
      Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)
      *   Flag any variables or strings that match common patterns for API keys (`API_KEY`, `_SECRET`), passwords, private keys (`-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
      detectorheader only
    • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token SKILL.md:44
      Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
      const apiKey = "sk_l…ghi";
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:44
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      const apiKey = "sk_l…ghi";
    • low Secrets in code secret-aws-key SKILL.md:47
      AWS access key ID (placeholder value)
      accessKeyId: "AKIA…PLE",
      placeholder
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:74
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      *   **Privilege Escalation Flaws:** Look for code paths where a user can modify their own role or permissions in an API request (e.g., submitting a JSON payload with `"role": "admin"`).
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic SKILL.md:110
      Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input (documentation of a security skill)
      os.system(f"grep 'pattern' {filename}")
      security skill

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)

    Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Standard Operating Procedures: Security Analysis Guidelines) differs from the folder (securityreview)
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4541 tokens
    • 100Steps. 46 steps
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 192: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 20 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 46 items
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.