CF senior-security
Security engineering toolkit for threat modeling, vulnerability analysis, secure architecture, and penetration testing. Includes STRIDE analysis, OWASP guidance, cryptography patterns, and security scanning tools.
Security engineering toolkit for threat modeling, vulnerability analysis, secure architecture, and penetration testing.
As a process F 35/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: ../senior-devops/, ../senior-secops/, ../senior-backend/
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 14
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 14
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medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/secret_scanner.py:165Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)regex=r'-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/secret_scanner.py:174Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)regex=r'-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/secret_scanner.py:183Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)regex=r'-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/secret_scanner.py:192Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)regex=r'-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----',
detectorheader only -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalreferences/cryptography-implementation.md:453Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)password = "user…123!"
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low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalreferences/security-architecture-patterns.md:347Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)password: constr(min_length=12, max_length=128)
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low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalreferences/security-architecture-patterns.md:583Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)API_KEY = "sk-1…def"
placeholder -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/threat-modeling-guide.md:221Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- KeyLog: Keylogger
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/threat-modeling-guide.md:237Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)| JWT forgery → Privilege escalation | High | Low | Critical |
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/threat-modeling-guide.md:469Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| A01 | Broken Access Control | E | IDOR, privilege escalation |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: Security engineering toolkit for threat modeling, vulnerability analysis, secure architecture, and penetration testing. Includes STRIDE analysis, OWASP guidance, cryptography patterns, an
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:8Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- penetration testing
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:21Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Security engineering tools for threat modeling, vulnerability analysis, secure architecture design, and penetration testing.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:266Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Authorization | Server-side permission checks on all endpoints | Privilege escalation |
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: ../senior-devops/ - warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: ../senior-secops/ - warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: ../senior-backend/ - warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: ../senior-architect/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "triggers"
Process rating: all ten parameters 35/100
- 0Tools and files. 4 referenced file(s) missing: ../senior-devops/, ../senior-secops/, ../senior-backend/
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Steps. 153 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3834 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 213: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 32 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 153 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.