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BD skill-safe-install

L0 级技能安全安装流程。触发“安装技能/安全安装/审查权限”时，强制执行 Step0-5（查重→检索→审查→沙箱→正式安装→白名单）。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 4 files body ≈ 376 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 3 d ago

L0 级技能安全安装流程。触发“安装技能/安全安装/审查权限”时，强制执行 Step0-5（查重→检索→审查→沙箱→正式安装→白名单）。

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:45
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    - 命令执行风险（sudo/rm/curl|bash 等）

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (skill-safe-install) differs from the folder (skill-safe-install-l0)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 25 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 376 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 68: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.