SKILLEMALL.ai

BD skill-security-scanner

Security scanner for OpenClaw skills. Use when installing, updating, or auditing skills to detect malicious backdoors, suspicious code patterns, data exfiltration risks, and security vulnerabilities. Automatically analyzes Python/JavaScript/Shell code for dangerous functions (eval, exec, system calls), network requests, file operations, environment variable access, obfuscation patterns, and known attack signatures. Provides security score and installation recommendations.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 4 files body ≈ 1 556 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Security scanner for OpenClaw skills.

As a process D 39/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSoftware developmentData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
39/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/rules-reference.md:140
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)
      | SUSP…001 | Keylogging | `\b(keyboard\|pynput\|hook\|GetAsyncKeyState\|keylogger)` | Critical |
      detectortable
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/rules-reference.md:177
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | PERM001 | Privilege Escalation | `\b(setuid\|setgid\|os\.chmod.*0o[0-7]{3,4}\|777\|sudo)` | High |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/rules-reference.md:177
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | PERM001 | Privilege Escalation | `\b(setuid\|setgid\|os\.chmod.*0o[0-7]{3,4}\|777\|sudo)` | High |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:12
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **System Compromise**: File deletion, permission changes, privilege escalation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:59
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      | SUSP…001 | Keylogger functionality | `pynput`, `keyboard` modules |
      detector

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 39/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (skill-security-scanner) differs from the folder (skill-security-scanner-clean)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 40 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1556 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -215 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 476: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 40 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.