AB SMTP Penetration Testing
This skill should be used when the user asks to "perform SMTP penetration testing", "enumerate email users", "test for open mail relays", "grab SMTP banners", "brute force email credentials", or "assess mail server security". It provides comprehensive techniques for testing SMTP server security.
This skill should be used when the user asks to "perform SMTP penetration testing", "enumerate email users", "test for open mail relays", "grab SMTP banners"…
As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, consistency, running it twice
The same skill appears in 1 more place: RA-Skills
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:2Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)name: SMTP Penetration Testing
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)description: This skill should be used when the user asks to "perform SMTP penetration testing", "enumerate email users", "test for open mail relays", "grab SMTP banners", "brute force email credentia
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:9Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# SMTP Penetration Testing
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:484Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)| Brute Force Blocked | Rate limiting/lockout | Slow down (`hydra -W 5`); use password spraying; check for fail2ban |
detector
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
name-formatname should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (SMTP Penetration Testing) differs from the folder (smtp-penetration-testing)
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 33 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2937 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 6 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 296: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 34 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 33 items
- +4Has examples (23 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.