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CD solid-agent-storage

Give your AI agent persistent identity (WebID) and personal data storage (Pod) using the Solid Protocol

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 9 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 2 076 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Give your AI agent persistent identity (WebID) and personal data storage (Pod) using the Solid Protocol

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
68/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
55
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 9

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 9
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/solid-http-reference.md:28
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/solid-http-reference.md:96
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/solid-http-reference.md:147
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -I -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/solid-http-reference.md:162
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "$ACL_URL"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/troubleshooting.md:89
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "${POD_URL}memory"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/troubleshooting.md:92
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "${POD_URL}memory/"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:100
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      **Step 2:** Use curl with `Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN` for any Solid operation.
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:117
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "${POD_URL}memory/notes.ttl"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:134
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -X DELETE -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "${POD_URL}memory/old.ttl"

    Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 17 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2076 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 103: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 20 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
    • +4Has examples (20 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 3)
    • +3All 4 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.