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BD strapi

Manage Strapi CMS content through the official @strapi/client SDK. CRUD on collection types, single types, and media files. Upload files to media library. Introspect content type schemas, relations, and components. Manage i18n locales and localized content (translations). Draft/publish workflow. Configure edit form layout (field order, sizes, labels). Manage end users, roles, and authentication. Use when the user asks about Strapi, headless CMS, content management, managing articles, blog posts, pages, entries, media files, upload images, upload from URL, download and upload, translations, localization, publishing, drafts, content types, schemas, form layout, edit view, users, roles, permissions, authentication, login, register, REST API, or creating/updating/deleting CMS content.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 20 files body ≈ 398 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Manage Strapi CMS content through the official @strapi/client SDK.

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key src/client.ts:6
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:22
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…7pY+zoMV…h0x/Ptw8…8dg==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:39
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…b00+Gxjx…zRc/oZwU…hzA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:107
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha512-vHk/hA7/1Ack…wbo+jaSh…Gtl+A5zq…HFg==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:141
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…Dsc+j03S…0oA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:430
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…NS8+tHW7…WOF+PEzk…X4Q==",
      detector

    Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 11 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 398 tokens
    • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 791: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 4 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.