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AB stride-analysis-patterns

Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Use when analyzing system security, conducting threat modeling sessions, or creating security documentation.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 2 files body ≈ 208 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats.

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, progress reporting

AnalyzerSecurityWriting and documentsResearchtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security resources/implementation-playbook.md:196
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      2. Penetration testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security resources/implementation-playbook.md:197
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      3. Bug bounty program
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security resources/implementation-playbook.md:356
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "Can privilege escalation occur through parameter manipulation?",
      detector

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 13 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 208 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 169: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 5 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.