FC SunoMaker
Automated Suno AI Music Generation - Create professional songs without manual intervention. Headless browser automation for servers with Gemini 3.1 Pro integration.
Automated Suno AI Music Generation - Create professional songs without manual intervention.
As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
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critical Exfiltration
exfil-send-secrets-to-urlSKILL.md:82Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint> **Step 2**: Upload the cookie file to the server:
Medium and low: 2
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:40Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionsecho "deb [arch=amd64] http://dl.google.com/linux/chrome/deb/ stable main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/google-chrome.list
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvSKILL.md:379Reads a .env filecat ~/.suno/.env
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
name-formatname should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens) - warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 46 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3207 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -216 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 164: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 27 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 46 items
- +4Has examples (18 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.