SKILLEMALL.ai

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Cut your LLM costs by 200x. Offload parallel, batch, and research work to Gemini Flash workers instead of burning your expensive primary model.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 60 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 956 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Cut your LLM costs by 200x.

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
76/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
78
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Instruction override medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.

For the author

An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 10

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 10
    • medium Instruction override en-ignore-previous CHANGELOG.md:122
      Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (detector / deny-list definition)
      - Injection attempts like "ignore all previous instructions" are logged and ignored
      detector
    • medium Instruction override en-ignore-previous lib/chain.js:160
      Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (code comment)
      // Override system prompt with perspective
      comment
    • medium Instruction override en-ignore-previous lib/worker-node.js:195
      Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (code comment)
      // Chain stages can override system prompt with a perspective
      comment
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host install.sh:6
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (code comment)
      # Usage: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/clawdbot/node-scaling/main/install.sh | bash
      comment
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:32
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha512-MqO+MLfM…tPI+z2IE…2Cm/XHO+7gGR…y9Q==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:41
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…kxx+f5Zn…CIX+vs/Mckw…xWQ==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:77
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…Y1B+7jIr…PG0/Wksn…XOA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:121
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…wr6+cbx+9Ohp…EEe+gR9u…9RA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:151
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…uWm+fFRcIOgKBMiOBP+eXiy…9ab+DDKA==",
      detector

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 55. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 24 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2956 tokens
    • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 143: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 25 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
    • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.