CD grove-tipping
Grove CLI guide - philosophy, commands, and quick start
Grove CLI guide - philosophy, commands, and quick start
As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 8
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 8
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:6Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)install: curl -fsSL https://grove.city/install-cli.sh | bash
vendor-host -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:132Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -fsSL https://grove.city/install-cli.sh | bash
vendor-host -
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:203Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- `keyfile.txt` — Wallet private key (for agent wallet mode)
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:254Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -fsSL https://grove.city/install-cli.sh | bash
vendor-host -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellscripts/auto-fund.sh:118Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; the skill's own vendor host)echo "Install with: curl -fsSL https://grove.city/install-cli.sh | bash" >&2
code literalvendor-host -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellscripts/batch-tip.sh:102Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; the skill's own vendor host)echo "Install with: curl -fsSL https://grove.city/install-cli.sh | bash" >&2
code literalvendor-host -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlscripts/monitor-balance.sh:54Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)$0 --webhook https://hooks.slack.com/... # Send Slack alerts
placeholder -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellscripts/monitor-balance.sh:106Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; the skill's own vendor host)echo "Install with: curl -fsSL https://grove.city/install-cli.sh | bash" >&2
code literalvendor-host
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "install" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "updated"
Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (grove-tipping) differs from the folder (tip-with-grove)
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 51 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2418 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 55: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 19 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 51 items
- +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
- +3All 3 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.