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DC trending-skills-monitor

Track and discover trending, new, and recently updated skills from ClawdHub. Filter by interests (3D printing, coding, automation, etc.), category, or search keywords. Get daily/weekly reports or enable watch mode for continuous monitoring.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 10 files body ≈ 3 254 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Track and discover trending, new, and recently updated skills from ClawdHub.

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, consistency, running it twice

IntegrationTelegramSlackData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
47
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: skill-library-mcp, skill-library-mcp

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url INSTALLATION.md:201
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    curl -X POST https://hooks.slack.com/services/YOUR/WEBHOOK/HERE \
  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:384
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    curl -X POST https://hooks.slack.com/services/YOUR/WEBHOOK \
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc INSTALLATION.md:59
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export CLAWDHUB_API_URL="https://hub.clawdbot.com/api/v1"' >> ~/.zshrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc INSTALLATION.md:60
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export CLAWDHUB_API_KEY="your-api-key"' >> ~/.zshrc
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/clawdhub_api.py:24
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention INSTALLATION.md:139
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process README.md:153
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup trending-skills-monitor --watch --interval 3600 > ~/.skills-monitor.log 2>&1 &

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (trending-skills-monitor) differs from the folder (trending-skills-monitor-skill)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 65 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3254 tokens
  • low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -31 of 6 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 240: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 50 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 65 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (28 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.