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DB vps-openclaw-security-hardening

Production-ready security hardening for VPS running OpenClaw AI agents. Includes SSH hardening (custom port), firewall, audit logging, credential management, and intelligent alerting. Follows BSI IT-Grundschutz and NIST guidelines with minimal resource overhead.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 12 files · 7 scripts body ≈ 681 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Production-ready security hardening for VPS running OpenClaw AI agents.

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

AnalyzerInfrastructureWriting and documentsAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
40/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
22
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 20

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:186
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cat > /etc/cron.d/agent-security <> 'EOF'
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:199
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    chmod 644 /etc/cron.d/agent-security
Medium and low: 18
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security README.md:274
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo ufw disable
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:281
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo rm /etc/cron.d/agent-security
    security skill
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/critical-alert.sh:46
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/daily-briefing.sh:129
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/verify.sh:99
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    check "Security cron installed" "test -f /etc/cron.d/agent-security"
    code literal
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/weekly-report.sh:31
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:171
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Privilege escalation attempts
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:188
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # Failed privilege escalation
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:216
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Privilege escalation detected
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.md:281
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo rm /etc/cron.d/agent-security
    security skill
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/critical-alert.sh:46
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/critical-alert.sh:196
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    elif echo "$event_data" | grep -q "type=SYSCALL.*setuid"; then
    detectorcode literal
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/daily-briefing.sh:129
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/install.sh:83
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable fail2ban 2>/dev/null || warn "Could not enable fail2ban"
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/install.sh:148
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable auditd
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/install.sh:177
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable unattended-upgrades
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/weekly-report.sh:31
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
    placeholder
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:88
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Privilege escalation alerts

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 26 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 681 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 7 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 262: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.