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BD weibo-manager

Control Weibo via Puppeteer (Unofficial API). Supports requesting posts, admin approval flow, and executing posts with text/images.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 43 files body ≈ 910 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Control Weibo via Puppeteer (Unofficial API).

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationPlaywrightAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
87
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 13

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 13
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:74
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…bKX+KS9G…yMA/NhKJ…RGz/Q==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:138
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…9dM/mwVgvbZJaSNaRk+bshk…Kbz+IoId…W0Q==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:189
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Nsx+IAh7…8CA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:307
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…5ZW+sJaK…eyQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:334
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-we+NuQo2DHhSl+DP6j…bSU+VTcp…8a0+gbZ7ChLpgg==",
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/delete_latest.js:21
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage']
    detectorcode literalfixture
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/delete_post.js:22
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage']
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/force_login.js:23
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage', '--window-size=1280,800']
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/learn_structure.js:22
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage']
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/list_posts.js:21
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage']
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/login.js:19
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage']
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/publisher.js:21
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage']
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/verify_login.js:24
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage']
    detectorcode literal

Files scanned: 43. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 17 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 910 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 131: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.