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Backup and restore OpenClaw agent memory to IPFS with AES-256-GCM encryption and X1 blockchain CID anchoring

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 12 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 755 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Backup and restore OpenClaw agent memory to IPFS with AES-256-GCM encryption and X1 blockchain CID anchoring

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice

ProcedureGitHubDockerAI and agentsSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
72/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Obfuscation medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.

For the author

Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • medium Obfuscation obf-base64-blob README.md:134
    Long base64-looking blob
    X1 Transaction: 5h1X…ccV
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:62
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - ✅ Security fixes: removed "curl | sh" Solana CLI install suggestion
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:113
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…0ah+lGiA…co6+9GrJ…naQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:179
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…kJw+JUEz…Ry8+JzNy…KLw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:188
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Mvo+5lex…ani+adC5PQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:212
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-c/I8ZRb51j+pYGA…kSk+qT2Ea+OdWElz/OiMf…ihw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:227
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…8fQ+wE2m…hIQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:133
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
    Backup uploaded, CID: QmEx…tuv
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:198
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
    "cid": "QmEx…tuv"
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/anchor.js:9
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'Memo…b2T', // Solana Memo v2
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/anchor.js:10
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'Memo…7Vn', // Solana Memo v1
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal src/anchor.js:33
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    const secretKey = Uint…rom(walletData.secretKey);

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "files"

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 85Steps. 59 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2755 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 108: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -212 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 30 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 59 items
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.